Flexibility in power demand, diverse usage patterns and storage capability of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) grow the elasticity of residential electricity demand remarkably. This elasticity can be used to form the daily aggregated demand profile and/or alter instantaneous demand of a system wherein a large number of residential PEVs share one electricity retailer. In this paper, we propose a demand response technique to manage vehicle-to-grid enabled PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging) in order to reduce the overall electricity procurement costs for a retailer bidding to a two-settlement electricity market, i.e., a day-ahead and a spot or real-time (RT) market. We show that our approach is decentralized, scalable, fast converging and does not violate users' privacy. Extensive simulations show significant overall cost savings can be achieved for a retailer bidding to an operational electricity market by using the proposed algorithm. This technique becomes more needful when the power grid accommodates a large number of intermittent energy resources. There, RT demand altering is crucial due to more likely contingencies and hence more RT price fluctuations and even occurring the so-called black swan events. Finally, such retailer could offer better deals to customers as well to stay competitive.
I. INTRODUCTION
P LUG-IN electric vehicles (PEVs) increase the elasticity of residential electricity demand profile substantially. In particular, when a retailer provides electricity to a large number of PEV owner customers, the inherent flexibility in PEVs' demand, the diversity in the usage patterns, and the energy storage capability of PEVs could be utilized to save electricity costs.
In addition, ambitious plans, aspiring incentives, subsidies and supports for introducing PEVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) into the transport sector have been set in many countries [1] . The roadmap is advocating industries Manuscript and governments to attain an overall PEV/PHEV sales share of at least 50% for light duty vehicle (LDV) sales by 2050 worldwide [2] . The future paradigm of electricity markets is a subject of question and debate as various changes are occurring that remould existing electricity generation, transmission and consumption formats. Massive integration of renewables, more efficient consumption through demand response (DR) techniques and transition of consumers to prosumers are some of such principal alterations [3] .
In a deregulated power grid, electricity retailers submit their demand bids to the wholesale market. For example, for a day-ahead (DA) market, these demand bids could often have both a desired power demand's quantity and a price component. This indicates that the retailer buys the specified power quantity, provided the market clearing price (MCP) is not higher than its offered price. This bidding process could be implemented in a few rounds to let the retailers modify and update their bids prior to the final clearance in the market.
Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection runs the largest competitive wholesale electricity market on the globe [4] . The average prices of electricity per MWh for DA and RT markets which have been sold in year 2014 are very close, i.e., $48.95 and $48.21, respectively [5] . However, this fact may misrepresent the nature of these two markets at the first glance. The details about hourly pricing data for DA and RT markets could be completely distinct and unpredictable at several days and/or hours.
In fact, large spikes may be seen due to unexpected imbalances in supply and demand, for example, when a large production generator faces a black-out or temperatures are suddenly changing. Hence, the high uncertainty, particularly in the RT market, can remarkably impact the overall electricity procurement cost for a retailer. The spikes could occur more frequently when the whole grid is relying on numerous intermittent energy resources, e.g., wind farms and solar panels, where more RT price fluctuations and even so-called black swan events [6] may occur.
On the other hand, mean reversion theory tells us that prices and returns ultimately proceed back towards the mean or the average. This mean or average can be the historical average of the price or return or another sensible mean [7] . In other words, it is not very likely that the unprecedented spikes keep on occurring and last very long.
A. Summary of Technical Contributions
In the paper, we adopt the flexibility and diversity in the power demand and availability time of PEVs from real world data. Then, we propose a cost minimizing algorithm suitable for the retailers dealing with existing operational markets using both offline demand shaping and online demand altering. The contributions of this article can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a fast converging and scalable DR technique which minimizes the overall electricity procurement cost for a retailer or an aggregator while preserving the privacy of individual users. • Our presented algorithm is capable of shaping and altering the aggregated demand profile in response to DA and RT markets, especially when unexpected price fluctuations occur. • The approach offers a suitable mechanism for the retailer to decide when and how to respond to price fluctuations in the RT market. • We provide a simple way to lay our algorithm in a game theoretic framework. We define the requirements by which the game can have a Nash equilibrium (NE) to guarantee that our proposed approach can yield to all users' best turnovers. • Our presented results are based on an operational electricity market, PJM [5] , and available vehicle usage patterns, from NHTS [8] .
B. Related Work
Reference [4] describes the characteristics of the PJM DA and RT electricity markets. The author discusses that economic motivations make the DA and RT market prices converge in the bidding processes. Additionally, locational marginal pricing (LMP) based markets guarantee steady grid operations by using pertinent pricing signals to the retailers.
An overview of demand response (DR) and their various classifications in a deregulated electricity market is discussed in [9] . de Sisternes et al. [10] compare different bidding rules in wholesale electricity markets when there exist PEVs and renewables' penetration in the power grid.
In reference [11] the aggregator controls directly the EV charging. Wu et al. [12] do not use the full elasticity offered by PEVs nor their V2G capability. They just simply consider 10pm to 7am for PEVs charging. Momber et al. [13] have proposed a leader-follower bi-level programming for the retailers and for the final users. They use pricing signals for the end users to control their PEVs load demand which has its own complexities and needs considerable computing resources as the authors indicated in the paper as well. Moreover, although the technique is decentralized, the upper level in the provided algorithm needs to know local vehicle characteristics which violate users privacy. The same problem about privacy exists in [14] . Paper [15] considers that the electricity cost model in the energy market is known -and is similar to that of thermal generators-to the retailers or aggregators.
In [16] , bidding strategies of electric vehicle (EV) aggregators in DA and ancillary services markets are investigated. Vagropoulos and Bakirtzis [17] present a two-stage stochastic optimization approach for an electric vehicle (EV) aggregator engaging in DA and regulation markets to reduce the energy cost by optimal bidding. Nevertheless, their proposed method imposes some inconvenience on the customers and the aggregator needs access to private information of the EVs, e.g., arrival time, departure time and battery capacity. The same issue exists in [16] and [18] - [22] . Mohsenian-Rad [23] , discusses how a time-shiftable load, that may be comprised of several time-shiftable subloads, can send demand bids to DA and RT markets to minimize its electricity procurement cost. Although this paper provides optimal closed-form solutions for bidding, they do not seem to be applicable for the residential sector wherein the retailer does not have detailed information about customers' preferences due to privacy concerns.
In [24] , we present a statistical modelling and a closedform expression for PEVs' uncoordinated charging demand. Furthermore, in [25] we propose a decentralized demand shaping algorithm for priori known desired demand profiles for the next day. In [26] , we introduce the idea of joint shaping and altering the demand briefly. In [27] , support vector machines (SVMs), a set of supervised machine learning modellings, are used in order to find the best model to fit the data from real-world PEVs power demand.
In [28] , charging and discharging of PEVs are managed in order to maximize the social and individual welfare functions. However, in residential sector, defining appropriate utility and welfare functions for the individual users is very ambiguous.
In this paper, we provide a new architecture in which a joint demand shaping and altering algorithm is used to manage PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging). The objective is to minimize the electricity procurement cost of a retailer bidding to two-settlement electricity markets, i.e., DA and RT markets. This algorithm includes both offline and online DR. We adopt PJM Interconnection pricing data [5] for the year 2014 to evaluate our algorithm's results and efficacy.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the underlying model of the power grid in this paper which contains the energy market, the electricity retailers, end users and necessary communication infrastructure. We articulate different parts of this model in the sequel. Fig. 1 shows a basic smart power grid model. Independent system operator (ISO) is supervising the market while generators and retailers deal electricity in the market. Here, we assume that retailers can also inject electricity back to the market and sell it.
In a fully liberated electricity market, the bidding interactions between retailers and generators can be formulated and modelled as games, e.g., a Stackelberg game [29] . In that case, the supervisory role of the ISO could be captured into the game's formulations and constraints. However, here, we consider an operational electricity market described by data. Fig. 2 represents multiple users sharing one electricity retailer or aggregator. Different retailers exist in the power system and they compete to expand their market capacity by offering better deals to the customers. The information about users' total energy need is updated continuously for a retailer and the retailer is supposed to know the overall daily energy consumption of its subscribers by referring to the records. We should notice that the retailer is dealing with two markets in our system model. One is the DA market and the other one is the RT market. Recorded data is mainly used for proper bidding to the DA market and updated information about users' instantaneous power consumption for the RT market.
The retailers can provide users the smart devices which are in charge of implementing the provided algorithm in this paper. It is just like what current communication companies and operators do for modems and other necessary equipments. Regarding the communication infrastructure, it is handled by Internet, and as the information users need to know to manage their demand is little, there is no burden on data transmission for the Internet. Users just receive and send 24 numbers.
Although there are some household appliances whose demand can be controlled, e.g., water heaters, pumps, heating ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems, our focus in this paper is on PEVs. Thus, we assume that the users' overall load consists of two distinct types of load; typical household load which normally needs on-demand power supply, e.g., air conditioning, lighting, cooking, refrigerator, etc., and PEV as a flexible load. In this model, the dotted lines illustrates the underlying communication and information system while the solid lines show the power cabling infrastructure. PEVs' charging is managed by an intelligent but simple device installed at users' homes.
We formed the pricing data for PJM market in 2014 into the following matrix for the DA market:
We also did the same for the RT market. Then, the annual standard deviation for each hour of a day in PJM DA and RT markets is found as follows: Fig. 3 shows the annual hourly standard deviation of the price for both DA and RT markets in 2014. As it can be observed and was expected, the spot market's prices can deviate much more for most hours of a day.
We assume that a retailer prefers to shape its aggregated demand profile and emulate it to the profile purchased from DA market. Then, it is better able to minimize its demand from the RT market, which is much more prone to price volatility, see Fig. 3 , to balance the load and accordingly lower the overall electricity procurement cost for each next day. This becomes even more important when the power system integrates a large number of renewables with intermittent behaviours. The assumption comes from obvious facts about pricing and dealing in any other major market, e.g., oil and gas markets. This cost reduction enables the energy retailer to offer better deals to the customers in the form of cheaper pricing, random rewarding, promotions, etc., and expand its market capacity.
In practice, the shaped aggregated profile for the next day does not exactly match the retailer's purchased DA profile. Hence, the retailer often needs to reciprocate the load imbalances at each time slot of the following day by buying electricity from the RT market.
On the other hand, we should notice that residential DR is desired to be implemented such that users' privacy is not violated. Therefore, a DR practising retailer can expect more participation from the users if the actual DR is implemented in each user's house in a decentralized fashion according to our model. This also eases the burden of heavy computations on a central unit and makes the algorithm more scalable.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we first formulate the electricity procurement cost for the retailer and then provide our proposed joint demand profile shaping and altering algorithm.
In our analysis, we assume a daily energy assignment horizon and, without loss of generality, a time granularity of one hour. Let (l d , p d ) represent the pair of load l d and price p d vectors which have been cleared in the DA market, i.e.,
for which, the units of l d i and p d i are MWh and $/MWh, respectively. Similarly, assume that (l i , p r ) represents the pair of load l i and price p r vectors which are the load imbalance and RT price vectors in the following day:
The values of the elements of these vectors will be known to the retailer only at each time slot of the next day. Then, the overall electricity procurement cost for the next day can be formulated as follows:
here, C is the overall energy procurement cost over the energy assignment horizon, i.e., 24 hours. First, given the purchased profile from the DA market by the retailer, i.e., l d , the users individually contribute to follow this demand profile by solving the sequential optimization problem P1. The objective is to minimize the correlation between each user's PEV energy assignment vector l PEV,n and its own inflexible demand vector l A,n plus the demand vector from other N − 1 users l −n , and also to maximize the correlation between l PEV,n and the purchased DA load vector l d (see Algorithm 1):
β n t=α n l t PEV,n = E PEV,n ,
In the above, < x, y > shows the inner product or correlation between vectors x and y, and l PEV,n and l A,n show the energy assignment vectors for user n's PEV and the aggregated load from its household appliances, respectively. E PEV,n is the n th user's required energy to be allocated to its PEV. Likewise, α n and β n represent the arrival time and departure time of the PEV. Furthermore, |l t PEV,n | ≤ p max limits the maximum power that can be delivered to/from the PEV and T P PEV,n represents the permissible charging time set or simply the set of time slots during the PEV's connection time to the power grid. Additionally, l −n is the aggregated power profile from other N − 1 users described as follows:
In (12), C PEV,n is the total storage capacity of the user n's PEV and we assume that in case of employing V2G in the system, PEV's state of charge (SOC) should not fall below 20% of that total capacity for emergency usage and in order to make sure that the adverse impacts on PEV's battery lifetime due to complete depletion are avoided. In fact depth of discharge (DOD) and the battery lifetime have a strong correlation [30] . Second, knowing the fact that (l i , p r ) is unknown to the retailer a priori, at each time slot t 0 of the next day after getting this information, the retailer may decide to alter the previously shaped demand profile to minimize its RT electricity purchase to balance the load and even sell back some of its pre-purchased electricity from DA market if the RT price rises significantly due to the state of the RT market or contingencies.
As the chances for the price to remain that high during all the next few hours of the day is low, reshaping the load profile by lowering the electricity consumption at that time slot and purchasing electricity at the next time slots could yield a lower cost in practice. This is also true for purchasing electricity at those time slots when price, unexpectedly, falls down significantly. The retailer may purchase extra electricity at those specific time slots (based on the overall storage capacity coming from connected PEVs) and reshape the demand for the next hours when the RT prices might be higher, see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 .
We should note that the retailer is assumed to be capable of indirectly employing the existing flexibility (offered by each user's PEV). Nonetheless, the electricity consumption behaviours of the users (their PEVs' usage patterns) need not be changed and hence the algorithm imposes no restrictions on the users' comfort. Moreover, users' privacy is protected here.
In addition, we use a weighted moving average window as the threshold γ K (t) in Algorithm 1 based on which the retailer proceeds for RT demand altering:
in which, K is making the length of the window K + 1 time slots and w i is defined as follows:
where 0 < ζ ≤ 1 is the forgetting factor which gives exponentially less weight to older time slots. We should note that in the above formulation, for a negative i, it must be calculated in modulo 24. For instance, if K = 3 and t = 1, then i = −2 and i mod 24 = 22. These weights can be calculated based on historical data.
Then, the following linear multi objective programming (MOP) allows demand altering at time slot t 0 when p r t 0 is known and can be compared to γ K (t) along with pursuing the shape of the pre-purchased electricity from DA market (see Algorithm 1):
In the above, the value of b is either -1 or +1 according to Algorithm 1, while 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and (1 − λ) are the weights of the objective functions. Equation (17) means the new assigned demand profile l PEV,n must be equal to the previous one by time t 0 when the demand alteration is to take place. In (21), SOC t=t 0 −1 PEV,n is the SOC of the user n's PEV before time slot t 0 and, similar to P1, we assume that in case of employing V2G in the system, the SOC should not fall below 20% of the total PEV's storage capacity.
We should note that when λ = 0, the ultimate possible flexibility that can be achieved from PEVs is obtained for a particular time slot. In this case, however, compliance with pre-purchased power profile from the DA market is sacrificed. On the other hand, when λ = 1, there would be no altering in the profile.
The value of λ mainly depends on the price at time slot t, the storage capacity of connected PEVs at that time and the loss due to not following the previously shaped aggregated demand profile, respectively. In such cases, where it is not straightforward or impossible to formulate a function, using a fuzzy approach can help translate descriptive qualities into functions. An application of this technique is presented in [31] for adjusting the step sizes in adaptive algorithms.
IV. REMARKS

A. Convexity and Convergence
We should note that according to P1 and P2 and as described in Algorithm 1, the optimization variables are not binary, i.e., on/off. It is not an integer or binary optimization problem. In fact the optimization variables are the amount of load l PEV,n to be assigned to a particular PEV. Hence, both P1 and P2 are convex by definition and their convergence is clear.
The convergence criterion in Algorithm 1 can be simply assumed as a desired number of iterations for updating all users' demand profiles, or it can be set and subjected to some predetermined error function, e.g., a desired mean square error (MSE) between two subsequent iterations of achieving Algorithm 1 Offline & Online Demand Response 1: Each user initializes its respective load profile over the assignment horizon based on its power demands, i.e., l n for n = 1, . . . , N. 2: All N users send their initialized load profiles to the retailer. 3: while not reaching convergence do 4: for n = 1 to N do 5: The retailer calculates the state information l −n according to (13) for user n. 6: The retailer sends (l −n − l d ) to user n. 7: User n solves problem P1 and updates its load profile l n . 8: User n sends back the new demand profile to the retailer.
9:
The retailer updates l n . 10: end for 11: end while 12: for t = 1 to 24 do 13: The retailer receives information from RT market, i.e., p r t .
14:
γ K (t) is calculated in (14) . 15: if (p r t = γ K (t)) then 16: if (p r t > γ K (t)) then 17: b = +1.
18:
20:
end if 21: The retailer proceeds for demand altering. 22: while not reaching convergence do 23: for n = 1 to N do 24: The retailer sends demand altering signal at time slot t to user n. 25: User n solves problem P2 and updates its load profile l n .
26:
User n sends back the new demand profile to the retailer.
27:
The retailer updates l n .
28:
The retailer calculates the state information l −n according to (13) for user n. 29: end for 30: end while 31: end if 32: end for aggregated demand profiles. Furthermore, as discussed in [25] , a convergence is guaranteed to be obtained.
When all the users solve the local optimization problems sequentially as described in Algorithm 1, then the overall objective function either decline or stay constant. Thus, the convergence of the algorithm follows from this fact.
B. Scalability
The scalability comes from two features existing in the proposed algorithm. First, the amount of data transferred in the whole system is little. It is just 24 numbers -when we assume one hour time granularity in a day-both for the retailers and for the users. Thus, the information transmission is easily done by the Internet infrastructure. Second, the proposed algorithm is simple and does not need much computation resources as each user manages its demand profile individually and the provided optimization problem P2 does not take much time. We later show in Section V that even for a system of 1,000 households -which could cover an area-the simulation time is less than 3 minutes in a serial programing format.
C. User Friendliness and Autonomy
In the proposed technique, there is no inconvenience imposed on the users. Moreover, their privacy is not violated as we emphasized before. Additionally, the users do not need to monitor their household energy consumption when they own PEVs as the proposed approach is using the existing elasticity in the system. Meanwhile, it is clear that the algorithm is autonomously done at each user's household.
D. Game Theoretic Framework
The users' contribution in Algorithm 1 can be modelled as a cooperative game with complete information [25] . In this case, each user is assumed to be a player trying to maximize its own payoff by using strategies P1 and/or P2.
We should note that, here, the payoff function for user n is determined by the retailer and depends on its marketing strategies. This payoff function could be defined such that the game possesses Nash equilibrium. If the defined payoff function is a concave function then the game becomes a concave N-person game since the allowed strategies are chosen from convex, closed and bounded sets in either optimization problems P1 or P2. In this case, the existence of a Nash equilibrium directly results from [32] Theorem 1. Moreover, this ensures that the proposed approach is yielding to all users' best turnovers.
Another good point about setting our algorithm in a game theoretic framework which does have Nash equilibrium and the above-mentioned properties is that it implies the algorithm has the strategy proofness (SP) property as well [33] . In other words, participants in this game will have lower payoffs if they do not provide their correct demand profiles to the retailer, i.e., if they want to cheat.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm in the previous section through computer simulations. In our simulations, the number of users (residential electricity consumers with PEVs), N, is 1,000 and the optimization horizon is considered to be a day, i.e., 24 hours for a DA programming scenario with a time granularity of one hour. Also, K is considered to be 3 in (14) .
For the PEVs usage patterns, i.e., the arrival times, departure times and vehicles' energy demands, our data and distributions are based on 2009 NHTS data [8] . We considered new standard outlets, NEMA 5-15, with 1.8 kW power output. Furthermore, the SOC for each PEV at the arrival time is as follows in percentage points:
In other words, we assumed that PEVs are 100% charged by their respective next departure time. Additionally, we considered 24 kWh energy storage capacity for PEVs according to Nissan Leaf model [34] . We adopted the PJM interconnection electricity market pricing data for both DA and RT markets in year 2014 [5] . Fig. 6 shows the DA and RT prices for 9 March 2014 as an example. We selected this day since it had the highest unexpected peak in RT prices throughout that year in PJM interconnection and can be assumed as what we earlier referred to as a black swan event in the market. As it can be observed, the RT price has a substantial peak at 9.00 A.M. around which the price is unexpectedly high for 5 hours. The retailer proceeds for demand altering program upon receiving the RT pricing information according to P2. Fig. 7 shows that RT prices are totally different for one day before and one day after that day. Fig. 8 . Electricity demand profile from normal household appliances, i.e., without PEVs and the overall electricity demand profile when users use PEVs with different usage patterns based on NHTS data. Fig. 9 . The assumed electricity profile purchased by the retailer from the DA market by the bids that could be cleared according to (23) .
Next, we examine the DR scheme introduced in Algorithm 1. Fig. 8 shows the electricity demand profile from only typical household appliances, i.e., without PEVs and the overall electricity demand profile when users use PEVs with different usage patterns based on NHTS data.
To model the power purchased from the DA market on each day, we assume that the amount of power cleared at each hour of the following day in the DA market depends on the required power at that time slot and also includes some randomness as follows:
where, u's are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) chosen from a uniform distribution with the following representation:
We used a uniform distribution here as it has the highest entropy among bounded distributions and gives the highest uncertainty [35] . Fig. 9 shows the electricity profile purchased by the retailer from the DA market according to (23) for different hours of a particular day. The results for shaping the DA demand profile only as well as joint shaping and altering the demand, Algorithm 1, are depicted in Fig. 10 . 1 We also assumed ζ = 0.75 in (15) and λ = 0.5 in (16) . In our simulations, convergence has been attained only after one single iteration of updating all users' demand profiles for both P1 and P2 in Algorithm 1.
It should be emphasized that since in our case the number of users is high enough and the users are homogeneous, i.e., all are residential users, the quality of the solution and the number of the iterations after which the convergence occurs does not depend on the ordering of the users. In other words, random ordering or any arbitrary ordering of the users for the implementation of Algorithm 1 yields to the same results. For a few number of users, the convergence does not happen after a single iteration.
In Table I , we investigated the effect of the number of users in the system on the number of iterations required to achieve convergence in Algorithm 1 and their respective simulation time. As it can be observed, the proposed technique has desirable and fast convergence feature when there is more number of users in the system.
In Table II , we compare the overall energy procurement costs on 9 March 2014 for the retailer in two extreme cases: case 1) when there is no PEV in the system and case 2) when all the users possess PEVs with their respective usage patterns. It can be noticed that in case 1, if the retailer could be absolutely successful in bidding to the DA market, i.e., there would not be any need to purchase electricity from the RT market (ideal occasion), the overall cost is only $674.4, for the pricing shown in Fig. 6 . In a more realistic case, when the retailer's bidding to the DA market is assumed to be according to Fig. 9 , and the retailer is required to balance the load, the overall cost is remarkably higher. Obviously, demand shaping and demand altering in this case are not applicable (N/A) as there is no PEV and hence no power demand elasticity in the system.
For the second case, when users possess PEVs, for the ideal bidding, the overall cost increases by almost 37% to supply electricity to the PEVs whereas for the realistic bidding it becomes more than double. When demand shaping P1 is employed, this overall cost reduces by around 18%. Furthermore, when joint demand shaping and altering in Algorithm 1 is used, cost decreases further by almost 10%.
In this case, we also assumed that the retailer is allowed to sell back its extra load purchased earlier from the DA market to the RT market at the same RT prices in the RT market.
In Table III , we evaluate the proposed technique in Algorithm 1 over the whole year of 2014 according to the PJM interconnection data. In this case, as stated in the algorithm, the retailer proceeds for minimizing its RT demand if p r t > γ K (t) and maximizes its purchase from RT market if p r t < γ K (t). It is observed that $151,407 can be saved in the whole year for the energy procurement cost of the system by using the proposed algorithm. The total dispatched energy for 1,000 users is 9.331 GWh for the whole year from which only 212.466MWh is from the V2G enabled PEVs' participation in P2 and demand alteration. But, we need to note that although the share of the electricity transferred to the grid by PEVs is negligible compared to the whole dispatched energy, the V2G transmission occurs at financially beneficial points. As discussed before in Section II, the retailer can decide upon which marketing approach to employ in order to attract more customers. This case is similar to what is addressed in [36] and [37] about behavioural economics.
It is worth mentioning that if the number of users grows, which could be expected in practice, the diversity that their PEVs' usage patterns offer to the system also increases and then even better results could be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we set forth a fast converging and decentralized algorithm for managing V2G enabled PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging) to lower the overall electricity procurement cost for an electricity retailer. Our proposed algorithm uses demand shaping and demand altering for the DA and the RT markets. In particular, when the power system has high penetration of intermittent energy resources, demand altering is crucial due to likely contingencies and hence more RT price fluctuations. In our simulation results, we considered the pricing data in PJM interconnection electricity market for the year 2014. We showed that significant overall cost savings (up to $151,407) for a retailer bidding to this electricity market could be achieved by using our proposed algorithm throughout the year. This allows the retailer to offer better deals to the customers and expand its market capacity and, at the same time, customers can enjoy lower electricity bills as well.
The work presented in this paper can be extended in various ways. First, PEVs' battery storage capacity has recently been expanded up to 60-85 kWh, e.g., for Tesla model S and model X [38] , which can provide much more elasticity for demand shaping and demand altering and hence reduce the electricity costs further. Second, our emphasis in this paper was on active power, this work can be extended to reactive power as well. Finally, although the main point of this paper was to present and illustrate the idea of PEVs' DR for DA and RT markets while preserving users' privacy, one may find more delicate approaches, e.g., by using recursive least squares (RLS), to discover γ and λ in (14) and (16) , respectively.
